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Abstract
This essay provides an historical overview of welfare reform efforts
prior to enactment of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 by the 104th Congress. The author argues that
the 1996 Act reaffirmed the labor market as the major arbiter of economic
well-being of American citizens. In so doing, passage of the Act signified
the formal end of income maintenance for able-bodied parents and
released the federal government from assuming major responsibility for
reducing poverty per se.

WELFARE REFORM: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This essay provides an historical overview of welfare reform efforts
prior to enactment of The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, signed into law by President Clinton on 22
August. 91 Although the end of the entitlement nature of welfare was
largely unforeseen, the emphasis in the Act on self-sufficiency and work
for able-bodied parents, particularly for mothers with young children, had
controversial roots since the 1960s. This essay explores those roots
chronologically, highlighting the major provisions of earlier welfare
reform efforts through the 103rd Congress. It documents a shift in the
philosophy from income maintenance to self-support. This essay suggests
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that passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 signified the formal end of income
maintenance for able-bodied parents and released the federal government
from responsibility for reducing poverty per se by reaffirming the labor
market as the major arbiter of economic well-being for American citizens.

WELFARE REFORM BEFORE THE REAGAN ERA

To set the stage and grasp the rationale behind changes incorporated
into The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, an
historical review is in order. Title IV of the 1935 Social Security Act
established the Federal-State program for aid to dependent children,
formally called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).92 In
1962, federal matching was made available for states whose AFDC
recipients aged eighteen or older and living with dependent children
participated in community work and training programs if certain
conditions regarding health and safety regulations, minimum-wage pay,
and income criteria were met. 93 States, however, determined what
constituted deductible work expenses. As a result, allowances for work
expenses varied tremendously across the country. Some states included
child care and work-related taxes such as social security, while others did
not. Some had flat allowances for work expenses while others treated
them on an "incurred" basis.
The 1967 Social Security amendments created the Work Incentive
Program (WIN) and required that AFDC recipients be referred to the
WIN program unless 1) under age sixteen, 2) ill or incapacitated, 3)
attending school, 4) needed to be continually present in the home because
of the illness or incapacity of another household member, or 5) exempted
by decision of the State agency. 94 The 1967 amendments called for
services to former (within the previous two years) and potential (within
the next five years) AFDC recipients and broadened purchase of services
by the welfare agency to include private as well as public agencies. Like
the 1962 changes, the 1967 amendments were meant to reduce the
welfare rolls by preventing family break-up and encouraging work.
Regulations from these amendments authorized twenty-one services,
sixteen of which were mandatory. 95 The theoretically expanded target
population and the service emphasis diverted Congressional intent.
Concrete services such as child protective care, legal services, and
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homemaker services had little bearing on employment but concerned
aspects of daily functioning. Competence-enhancing services designed to
strengthen family life, such as "family-planning information and
counseling," were difficult to monitor and assess in relation to
employment. 96 Early studies showed that only thirty-six percent of AFDC
families receiving child care as a service, for example, included mothers
who were working, training, or awaiting training. For the most part, childcare services went to families with nonworking and nontraining mothers,
many of whom were not AFDC recipients, but former or potential
recipients. 97\

Services and expenditures exploded between 1971 and 1972.98 The
threat of further increases prompted Congress in 1972 to put a limit on
1973 federal social services payments to states and to focus on selfsupport, not strengthening family life. 99 Only three of eleven services
were mandatory.' l0 Child care under AFDC was made optional, except
for WIN participants. Regulations further restricted eligibility by reducing
"former" AFDC recipients to within three months and "potential" AFDC
recipients to the next six months. 1 1 A coalition of sixteen national
welfare organizations formed to oppose the changes. Many denounced
deletion of strengthening family life as a goal. 10 2 And the
social service
10 3
services.
mandatory
of
reduction
the
to
objected
industry
On 4 January 1975, the Social Service Amendments of 1974 became
law.' 0 4 Title XX of the Social Service Act replaced Title IV-A (the adult
social services title) and virtually repudiated the 1972 amendments.
Under Title XX, states assumed responsibility for social services and
eligibility for services was expanded to include nonwelfare categories
such as the working poor and middle-income families. Half of Title XX
money had to be spent on welfare recipients. 10 5 The 1974 amendments
placated the social service and welfare organization communities, but
they also eroded the goal of the work-through-services strategy for AFDC
recipients. Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, AFDC service
recipients and expenditures accounted for a smaller proportion of Title
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XX recipients and funds10 6 expended, including day care, educationtraining, and employment.

As the work-through-services strategy receded, national policy also
sought to encourage work through incentives. The 1962 amendments
legislated exclusion of work expenses in the computation of a family's
welfare budget, but the states defined such expenses. 10 7 The 1967
amendments mandated that each state disregard a certain portion of
recipients' earnings, for the explicit purpose of inducing work. The law
stipulated that the first $30 per month of earnings plus one-third of the
remainder would be exempt as income to be counted toward reducing the
assistance payment. It affected only families already on AFDC, thereby
reinforcing its purpose to encourage those on welfare to work, not to
encourage those at work to become welfare-eligible. 10 8 Studies reported
by Mildred Rein in Dilemmas of Welfare Policy10 9 showed that work
effort, as measured by those at work while on welfare and cases closed
for employment, did not increase after the implementation of the thirty
and one-third disregard. On the whole, increased benefits and reduced
income incentives, such as including casual income in determining family
income, resulted in decreased work effort among AFDC recipients
throughout the country."10
Another work-through-incentive strategy, the negative income tax
(NIT), found favor in the 1970s."' The NIT, however, was aimed at the
working, not the welfare poor. It was to be attached to the universal
federal income tax system. Those whose income exceeded a certain
amount would pay and those with incomes below that level would receive
payment. The intent was to reduce the stigma associated with AFDC
receipt, as well as state discretion and variability among AFDC policies
and benefit levels.112 The NIT ideology influenced Nixon's failed Family
Assistance Plan (FAP) in 1969 and 1972, as well as Carter's aborted
Better Jobs and Income Program (BJIP) in 1977.' The Seattle-Denver
income maintenance (SIME/DIME) experiment, conducted between 1970
and 1978, showed that the NIT incentive plan reduced work effort, but
that decreases in work activity could be avoided by combining incentives
114
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and eventually became part of the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills
(JOBS) program of the Family Support Act of 1988."'

WELFARE REFORM DURING THE REAGAN AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS

This section discusses state-level and national reforms that occurred
during the Reagan and Bush administrations. 116 These reforms provided
the context of the welfare "experiments" the Clinton Administration
approved during the 103rd Congress and they constituted the ashes, so to
speak, from which The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act of 1996 rose in the 104th Congress.
In 1981, federal legislation permitted states to establish a Community
Work Experience Program (CWEP) designed to improve the
employability of AFDC recipients.' '7 In addition, states were permitted to
develop and operate a work supplementation program as an alternative to
AFDC. Participation was voluntary, but states could vary benefit levels
geographically and/or by categories of recipients. Federal requirements
regarding treatment of income could be wavered under this program. The
work-through-requirement employment experiments offered a variety of
educational, training, and other, supportive services such as health and
child care, to AFDC recipients. The mix of services varied from program
to program, in part reflecting differences among states and other political
subdivisions. 118
Results of seven WIN and WIN Demonstration studies showed that in
most cases, programs lead to consistent and measurable increases in
employment and earnings. 19 Positive impacts continued for three years in
states where data were available. During the final year of study, earnings
gains of 10 to 30 percent per eligible person in the AFDC caseload were
found. Welfare savings were usually smaller and less consistent than
employment gains. 120 There were two notable exceptions. West Virginia
experienced higher unemployment than many other areas and its workfare
program did not lead to increased employment and earnings. 12 The Cook
County, Illinois study also resulted in no statistically significant
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employment gains. 122 The Cook County program's mix of services,
however, was considered quite sparse in comparison to other programs
across the country. Aside from monitoring functions, the Cook County
program provided little direct assistance. 123 The West Virginia and Cook
County programs served as useful reminders of the importance of labor
market conditions and of the need to provide at least minimal assistance
to get employment results. These lessons were124applied in the formulation
of the Family Support Act of 1988 legislation.
In 1988, Congress passed the Family Support Act (FSA), affirming an
evolving vision of the responsibilities of parents and government for the
well-being of poor adults and their dependent children. 125 The new law
left intact the basic entitlement nature of AFDC and even expanded it by
requiring states to extend coverage to certain two-parent families. 126 In
addition, FSA sought to shift the balance between permanent income
maintenance and temporary support for the latter.
The anchoring
principle of FSA was that parents, fathers and mothers should be the
primary supporters of their children and that, for many people, public
assistance should be coupled with encouragement, supports, and
requirements to aid them in moving from welfare to self-support. 128 FSA
placed a responsibility both on welfare recipients to take jobs and
participate in employment services and on government to provide the
incentives and services to help welfare recipients find employment. For
the noncustodial parent, usually absent fathers, this was reflected in
greater enforcement of child support collections. 12 9 For the custodial
parent, usually mothers, this meant new obligations to cooperate in child
collection efforts, as well as new opportunities for publicly supported
child care, education, training, and employment services,
coupled with
130
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FSA established the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS)
Training program to assure that needy families with children would
obtain education, training, and employment necessary to help avoid longterm welfare dependency. 13 1 The JOBS program replaced several other
work-incentive programs, such as WIN and WIN DEMO projects of the
1980s. Child care and supportive services had to be provided to enable
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individuals to accept employment or receive training.
State JOBS
programs had to include appropriate educational activities, including high
school or equivalent education (combined with training as needed); basic
and remedial education to achieve functional literacy; job skills training;
job readiness activities; and job development and placement.' 3 3 State
programs must have also included, but were limited to two of the
following services: 1) group and individual job search; 2) on-the-job
training, during which the recipient is placed in a paid job for which the
employer provides training and wages and in return is paid a supplement
for the employee's wages by the state Title IV-A (AFDC) agency; 3)
work supplementation in which the employed recipient's AFDC grant
may be diverted to an employer to cover part of the cost of the wages paid
to the recipient; and 4) community work experience programs or other
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) approved work
programs that generally provide short-term work experience in public
134
projects.
The JOBS program also amended the "unemployed parent"
component of AFDC to provide that at least one parent in a family must
participate for a minimum of sixteen hours a week in a work program
specified by the state. If a parent was under age twenty-five and had not
completed high school, the State could require the parent to participate in
educational activities directed at attaining a high school diploma or in
another basic education program. The second parent could be required to
participate5 at State option unless he or she met another exemption
13
criteria.
In Welfare Reform or Revision: The Family Support Act of 1988,
Catherine S. Chilman criticized many aspects of the FSA legislation, not
the least of which was JOBS. 136 She noted that many requirements did not
apply to recipients in two-parent families. Where they did, fathers were
placed mainly in on-the-job training or "workplace" programs and were
provided with far fewer services than available to mothers. A possible
reason for this differential treatment was that work training and
placement experiments with AFDC men had resulted at best in only
marginal, if at all measurable, gains when experimental groups were
compared with controls.'
Another criticism was that funding for JOBS
was a "capped" entitlement. The federal government matched
expenditures of each state up to a fixed amount. Congressional
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appropriations for this part of FSA138 could not legally exceed the "cap,"
regardless of state need or demand.
Implementing JOBS presented further problems. Central to these
problems was the targeting of probably the most difficult groups,
particularly the long-term poor. Many of the long-term poor required
intensive individual remedial education, job training, numerous health
and social services, and carefully supervised job placement. To
economize, states and localities were tempted to train and place more
readily employable individuals and to use cheaper work-placement
methods, such as counseling recipients regarding their job-search
activities. 139 Training and placement of the more readily employable were
not seen as cost efficient in the long run based on the likelihood of these
individuals to find employment on their own. State and local
administrators of FSA needed to foster close relationships with already
existing job-training programs. The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982
(JTPA), which already had close working relationships with the private
sector, was looked to as a recommended training resource. 14 Because of
stringent performance standards set by the government, JTPA had tended
to "cream" the most job-ready trainees.141

STATE AND CONGRESSIONAL REFORM INITIATIVES DURING THE FIRST
Two YEARS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

During his presidential campaign, Bill Clinton promised to end
welfare as we know it. President Clinton unveiled his Administration's
proposal for reform on 14 June 1994.142 He did so in light of requests by
over two dozen states for waivers allowing them to make major changes
in their welfare programs. 143 These initiatives, like the Administration's
plan itself, encompassed three main issues: having babies while on
welfare, mandatory employment, and deadlines. In regard to single
parents and their babies, New Jersey, for example, provided free health
insurance, food stamps, and $64 a month for each child to mothers on
welfare, but the state's "child exclusion" provision drew the line at
children born to mothers already on welfare. 144 Having additional
children no longer increased the monthly check. In August and September
138
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1993, welfare mothers who had conceived after the program took effect
had 1,678 babies, 336 fewer than for the same two months in 1992.145
Georgia required unmarried women under the age of eighteen who were
pregnant or already mothers to live with a parent or guardian to be
eligible for welfare. 146 Georgia also froze the welfare benefits of mothers
on welfare for two years if they had another child. 147 And Minnesota
automatically withheld
child and spousal support from paychecks of
48
"deadbeat" parents. 1

In regard to mandatory employment, Florida's $30 million-a-year
"Project Independence" required its 18,000 single-parent participants to
attend orientation sessions and to contact at least twelve employers in
their job search. 149 Project Independence required enrollees with a tenthgrade education or recent work experience to find jobs. It also taught jobseeking skills such as resume-writing, and interviewing techniques to
those who did not find work immediately. 150 More extensive and costlier
training programs were for those with less education or work
experience. 151A study by an independent research group found that the
program, which started in 1990, reduced the welfare rolls by about five
percent and the earnings of program participants were seven percent
higher than those of welfare recipients not in the program. 152 California's
Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program cost more than $120
million a year and had about 60,000 participants who trained for several
months, in some cases up to a year, before seeking work. 153 One study
found that two years after entering the program, single parents, on
average, earned about twenty percent more than a similar group of nonparticipants. 154 Like Florida's155program, GAIN reduced the welfare rolls
by about four to five percent.
In regard to the issue of deadlines, Wisconsin's "Work Not Welfare,"
signed into law in December 1993 by Governor Tommy G. Thompson,
called for two counties to require welfare recipients to work for their
benefits. 156 In 1995, about 1,000 Wisconsin welfare enrollees were
required to have found full-time work or a job training program within
thirty days of signing up for assistance. After two years, their cash
145
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benefits were cut off although they still received health care and food
stamps.
Still other states requested to experiment with the Food Stamps
program to turn it into a job subsidy. Oregon's JOBS Plus and Missouri's
21st Century Communities, for example, converted Food Stamp and
AFDC benefits to wages. 157 Reorienting food stamp money into a job
subsidy enticed Democrats and Republicans eager to require welfare
recipients to work, but aware of the money necessary to underwrite such
efforts. Converting food stamp grants to cash could be viewed as
providing those funds. 158 The federal government159had approved eight
"cash out" demonstration projects along these lines.
In 1994, Georgia and Wisconsin joined New Jersey in placing a
family cap on AFDC benefits. 160 Five states (Colorado, Florida, Iowa,
South Dakota, and Vermont) followed Michigan's 1993 initiative to set
time limits on benefits and to require AFDC recipients to work after a
transition assistance period. 16 1 The programs included placement in
public 62service jobs or community service as well as flexible time
tables.

1

Several states cracked down on welfare parents whose children
missed too many school days. Wisconsin's Learnfare program, begun in
1988, became the model for reducing welfare benefits where there was
unreasonable truancy among teenagers in the family. 163 Ohio's Learning,
Earning, and Parenting Program (LEAP) reduced by $62 the164AFDC
benefit of teens with more than two unexcused absences a month.
An anti-welfare rhetoric pervaded the 1994 midterm elections. 165 A
consensus emerged to the effect that 1) the welfare system promoted
dependence on government, discouraged recipients from working,
penalized them for being married and provided bonuses for having
additional children, 2) welfare changed from being a temporary safety net
to a way of life with increasing numbers of long-term users, and 3)
welfare should involve the recipient's part responsibility beyond child
157
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care per se and toward self-support, entailing work requirements for
16 6
mothers and a crackdown on child support payments for fathers.
Several legislative proposals introduced into Congress prior to the Clinton
Administration plan reflected this consensus and drew from many state
initiatives. HR 3500, sponsored by Minority Leader Robert Michel (RIL), for example, would have imposed a two-year time limit on welfare
benefits, capped federal funding on several anti-poverty programs, and
ended welfare for most non-citizens. 167 S 16, sponsored by Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY),
authorized additional funding for the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
(JOBS) program, created in 1988, which provided AFDC recipients with
work, remedial education, and training. 168 HR 4051, sponsored by
Representative Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) created a child-support assurance
program, guaranteeing that the federal government would provide child
support if the non-custodial parent did not. 169 S 1795, sponsored by
Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), established time limits on welfare,
restricted benefits to legal aliens and required states to set up job
programs using vouchers. 170 And S 1891, sponsored by Senator Nancy
Kassenboum (R-KS) provided for enhanced federal funding of Medicaid
in exchange for state takeover of AFDC, food stamps and WIC, the1
17
special supplemental food program for Women, Infants and Children.
The Clinton Administration's plan essentially embraced the consensus
and reflected state efforts.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN: THE WORK AND RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF

1994
Americans had come to know welfare primarily in two senses: 1) as
an administrative culture more concerned with eligibility rules and
compliance with regulations and 2) as an income maintenance program
structured so that those who work were no better off than if they had
remained on welfare. 172 The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 aimed
to change both aspects of welfare, i.e., to instill a culture of self-support
that structured interactions and expectations around work and the
preparation of work, with the goal of moving clients off welfare and into
a labor market that offered increased opportunities for jobs paying wages
166
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and providing benefits exceeding those on welfare. The plan took an
incremental approach to changes in AFDC such as imposing time limits
on benefits, providing job-related education
and training, and assisting
173
enforcement.
support
child
with
states
A. Time Limits
The Administration's plan required recipients to work within two
years of accepting welfare benefits. Recipients who were capable of
working would have been limited to two years of government cash
assistance throughout their lifetime. Exemptions would have been
provided to those who were seriously ill or were caring for a disabled or
seriously ill child. As they entered the welfare system, recipients would
have received a twelve-month deferral from the time limits for their first
child, and a twelve-week deferral for another child. In addition, any time
spent on welfare up to age eighteen would not have been counted toward
the two-year limit. States would have been permitted to extend time limits
for a variety of reasons, provided these 1extensions
amounted to no more
74
than ten percent of the eligible caseload.
B. Work Requirements
Recipients who could not find a job would have been placed in
federally subsidized jobs. Each state would run a WORK program that
would make paid work assignments available to recipients who reached
the time limit. 175 States would provide child care, transportation and other
services to help individuals participate in the program. WORK recipients
would be paid the minimum wage, with each assignment between fifteen
and thirty hours per week. By fiscal year 2000, the plan estimated that
394,000 people would have been in subsidized jobs under the WORK
program, at a cost of $1.2 billion.176 If a job did not pay as much as
AFDC benefits, the worker would get funds to make up the difference.
Additional money would be spent on job training and education to ease
the transition into work, $2.8 billion over five years. 177 The plan applied
only to people born after 1971, because it would have been too costly to
include all welfare recipients immediately. This group would have
constituted about one-third of the welfare caseload in 1997 and two-thirds
of all welfare recipients by 2004. States would have had the option of
including more of their caseloads.
C. Teen Pregnancy, Child Support, and Other Provisions
See, e.g., Katz, supra note 76, at 117-22; Katz, supra note 52, at 1622-24.
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The Clinton Administration plan also envisioned a national
information clearing house and grants to local programs to combat teen
pregnancy, with a five-year cost of $300 million. 78 Every school-age
parent or pregnant teenager who received or applied for welfare would
have been required to finish school or enroll in a JOBS program. Parents
who were minors would have been required to live with a responsible
adult, preferably a parent, and states would have had the option to limit
benefit increases when all welfare recipients, including those born after
1972, had more children, as New Jersey, Georgia, and Arkansas had
done. 17 9 The plan also suggested that more efforts would have been made
to establish paternity at birth, and it proposed to spend $600 million over
five years to improve enforcement of court orders for child support and
related services. 80 The plan would have also permitted states to make it
easier for two-parent families to be eligible for AFDC payments. (At the
time, AFDC eligibility for two-parent families was limited to those in
which the principal wage earner was unemployed but had worked in six
of the last thirteen calendar quarters. 181 Loosening the laws however,
might have encouraged married couples to apply for welfare and thereby
expand the rolls significantly). Finally, the plan rejected the lead of House
Republicans and some moderate Democrats to cut off most welfare
benefits to immigrants, although some restrictions on aid to immigrants
and small cuts in benefits to alcoholics and addicts under the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and in emergency
assistance,82 among other provisions, would have helped finance the
changes.'
Neither Clinton nor Congress claimed that the objective of welfare
reform was to end poverty per se. In light of the cost of job training,
deference to deficit reduction, and reluctance to slow down or reverse
expenditures for entitlements, it remained doubtful that the
Administration's plan, or any of those proposed in the 103rd Congress or
experimented with by states, would have adequately addressed poverty as
we currently understand it. 183 At one of the early House Ways and Means
Committee's Human Resources
Subcommittee
meetings, both
Republicans
and
liberal
Democrats
challenged
the
Clinton
Administration's plan. 184 Under questioning by Robert T. Matsui (D-CA),
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Administrative officials David Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane admitted that
there was little research at the present time to support proposals to impose
time limits or permit states to deny additional benefits to AFDC recipients
when they had more children. 185 Under questioning by Rick Santorum (RPA) and E. Clay Shaw, Jr. (R-FL), officials sought to explain why work
requirements for welfare recipients would be waived for a year after the
birth of their first child while the Family and Medical Leave Act entitled
working people to only twelve weeks of leave. Bane replied that lowering
the exemption would have required more federal funds be spent on child
care. 186

The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 sought to reduce teen
pregnancy, improve child support, provide more money for job training
and education, impose time limits on unconditional welfare payments,
and make work pay. These goals obscured what remained the binary
powder keg of the reform effort: revenue neutrality and mandatory work.
Questions like "Where will the money will come from to cover costs for
educational, job training, and child support services?" "What is the best
way for local welfare agencies to increase the flow of welfare parents into
private-sector jobs?" "How will agencies find and administer a million or
more placements in community jobs for mothers who do not find privatesector jobs?" and "How can the opposition of public employee labor
unions be overcome?" begged to be answered.
In the name of family stability and togetherness, Clinton told the
nation in his January 25, 1994, State of the Union address his
Administration would no longer give adolescent mothers a check to set up
separate households.' 87 In his message to Congress transmitting his
Administration's proposal, Clinton highlighted teen pregnancy and out-ofwedlock births. "To prevent welfare dependency," Clinton admonished,
"teenagers must get the message that staying in school, postponing
pregnancy, and preparing to work are the right things to do."' 188 To the
extent that autonomous household units served an emancipatory function
of enabling such parents to escape abusive situations, such a policy would
be a disservice and would subject both mother and infant to potentially
greater harms than bearing the wrath of an increasingly mean-spirited
public.
Some of the legislation's proposals involved enormous costs,
especially time-limited welfare, which, while holding promise of saving
185
186
187
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See id.
President's State of the Union Address, Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 148-57 (Jan. 31,

1994).
188 President's Message to Congress Transmitting the "Work and Responsibility Act of
1994," Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep., at 1320-21 (June 21, 1994).

money in the long run, required creating new jobs in an economy with 8.3
million out of work. 189 Based on the then current AFDC caseload,
between 1.2 million and 1.5 million families would have been in need of
placements in either private-sector jobs or community service
positions. 19 Each job created for recipients forced off welfare at the end
of two years was estimated to cost $3,000, resulting in an annual cost of
just the jobs component between $3 billion and $5 billion.' 9' Harold E.
Ford (D TN), Chair of the House Ways and Means Human Resources
Subcommittee, recoiled from the prospect of forcing many mothers into
minimum-wage jobs and proclaimed deficit-neutral welfare reform plans
to be unrealistic. 92 Other estimates put the child care component, which
would allow welfare mothers to accept jobs, and transportation
allowances at an93additional $3,000 per person a year, thereby doubling
1
the annual total.
Proposals to supplement welfare benefits for working families when
their jobs paid less than welfare could have added billions of dollars to
the reform plan. The Earned Income Tax Credit, which was the only antipoverty program to survive the Clinton Administration's first budget
194
battle in Congress, has been expanded three times in seven years.
When the 1993 expansion is fully implemented, the EITC will augment
earned income by as much as $3,500 per year for low- and moderateincome working families. 195 Between 1993 and 1998, taxpayers will have
196
contributed roughly $105 billion to working families through the EITC.
By the end of 1996, nearly 18.7 million taxpayers were expected to take
advantage of the EITC, at an annual cost of
$25 billion; about double the
197
expenditures.
AFDC
of
share
1993 federal
Republicans had drafted their own version of welfare reform in an
effort to ride a wave of public opinion that seemed to favor transforming
welfare from an entitlement to a benefit that must be earned through
work. House Republicans introduced welfare reform legislation to
Congress both in 1993 and 1994.198 In the first session of the 104th
Congress, Republicans introduced HR 4. The Republican plan cut
benefits to welfare mothers who continued having children out of
"9 See Jeffrey L. Katz, Clinton's Attention to Welfare Boosts Supporters' Hopes, Cong.
Q. Wkly. Rep., at 176 (Jan. 29, 1994).
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wedlock; forced teen mothers on welfare to live at their parents' homes;
required mothers who apply for welfare to identify the child's father in
order to receive maximum benefits; cut welfare and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits to immigrants; and ended SSI benefits for
1 99
those whose disabilities were related to alcoholism or drug addiction.
Their 1995 plan also required that AFDC parents begin working within
two years of receiving aid and federal funds for cash welfare generally
could not be provided to any adult for more than five years. 20 0 After three
years of participation in the Work Program (and a total of five years on
AFDC), states had the option of dropping recipients from the AFDC rolls,
although recipients would continue to be eligible for Medicaid, Food
Stamps, and other benefits to which they were entitled. HR 4 was
estimated to save about $62.1 billion over five years and $102 billion
over seven
years. 20 1 Savings were to derived from AFDC, food stamps,
2 °2
and SSI.
On the whole, Congressional Republicans promised to place many
more welfare recipients in work programs, with less training, lower
benefits, and fewer protections than Democrats had proposed. 0 3 With a
Republican Congress and a shift of the political center to the right, the
prospect of eliminating benefits for young mothers, even those willing to
work, had become politically plausible. One such measure, sponsored by
Rep. James M. Talent (R-MO) and Sen. Lauch Faircloth (R-NC), would
have permanently denied benefits to children of unmarried mothers
younger than twenty-six, thereby removing 3.5 million children from the
welfare rolls.20 4 Rep. E. Clay Shaw (R-FL), who came to head the Ways
and Means Subcommittee which had jurisdiction over welfare in the
104th Congress, had reservations about eliminating benefits to mothers
older than eighteen. 20 5 In 1995, he would play a large role in moving the
Republican welfare proposal, HR 4, to centerstage in Congress. President
Clinton vetoed HR 4 on January 9, 1996, saying it would
do too little to
20 6
replace welfare with work and to make deep budget cuts.
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Many scholars and others recoiled from the provisions in both the
20 7
Clinton Administration's plan and in the Republican alternatives.
Research by the Manpower Development Corporation had indicated that
even the best designed education and training programs produced only
small gains for welfare recipients. 20 8 Eleanor Holmes Norton, head of the
Children's Defense Fund, remained sharply critical of the two-year limit
and she criticized the Clinton Administration for raising expectations
about radical change that it could not possibly bring about, although the
104th Congress proved her wrong. 20 9 It was possible, as Robert
Greenstein, director of the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, noted,
that the current system, despite its offensive aspects
to conservatives and
21
liberals, could be made worse than it had been. 0
Many viewed workfare efforts as another way of punishing the poor.
As this author and others have noted, for example, there was no
economically and politically practical way to replace welfare with work
with an annual average unemployment rate hovering around seven
2 11
percent and with the proliferation of low-wage employment.
Furthermore, there was little evidence that putting welfare recipients to
work would transform family structure, community life, and the alleged
"culture of poverty" as welfare reformists Mickey Kaus2 12 and Lawrence
Mead 2 13 so forcefully asserted. Laurence Lynn 214 argued that pushing illprepared young mothers and nearly disabled older ones into the
deteriorating job market, while seeking to get support from increasingly
destitute fathers, two FSA cornerstones, made no sense. Lynn called for
the end of welfare reform as we know it.
The composition of the 104th Congress was such that the ideological
center had shifted to the right of the political spectrum. Concerns about
social issues such as crime, illegal immigration, family values and
welfare reform had eclipsed economic issues, such as unemployment and
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inflation in importance. 2 15 Popularized books, such as Hernstein and
Murray's The Bell Curve,2 16 added respectability to fringe conservative
concerns about the "dilution" of American culture from both exogenous
(immigrant) and indigenous (underclass) forces and, at best, encouraged
nineteenth century social Darwinian solutions to contemporary
problems. 2 17 The political right seemed less likely to overhaul the current
welfare system than to eliminate Federal involvement and impose strict
sanctions for work- and/or other-related noncompliance. The abandoned
Reagan promise to devolve AFDC to the states, as exemplified in the plan
Jeb Bush put forth in his quest to be Governor of Florida and the
legislation Governor Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin had signed,
became the exemplars of what became national policy. 2 18 Welfare reform
themes like time limits, learfare, workfare and mandates returning to
their parents unwed teen parents who reside independently, all resonated
with a public that had lost confidence in a national government
overwrought with "centralized interest groups" seemingly beyond popular
influence219 and that remained determined to retain its government
entitlements. 220 This public, in effect, demanded that those on welfare
face the same risks and play by the same rules as many working poor
parents who primarily rely on their own resources in times of need.
Rather than a liberal consensus expanding benefits to the working poor
and some middle class families, the prevalence of an anti-tax and antigovernment mood among the populace and the Administration's
deference to deficit reduction set the stage for the Congressional
consensus more concerned with shrinking the welfare rolls and reducing
costs than with helping AFDC recipients escape poverty.
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